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In chapter one, I investigate the direct and indirect effects of employment decisions
on body weight. I formulate a dynamic model in which an individual makes decisions in
three stages in each period. He first chooses an occupation and realizes his wage. Then he
decides how to allocate money and time. As a result of his choices, his body weight updates
in the last stage. Using data from PSID and U.S. Census Bureau, I estimate a joint system
of equations and use a flexible error structure to account for selection on unobservables. I
find that employment decisions have insignificant effects on body weight because individuals
choose to compensate for changes in the workplace by adjusting their off-work food and
exercise behavior. Unlike in the production of most goods, changes in capacity for labor-
intensive services only affect outcomes of interest insofar as service providers change the
way they allocate their time in response to those capacity changes. In chapter two, we
examine how public sector service providers respond to unexpected capacity constraints in
the specific context of public health clinics. We exploit an exogenous reduction in public
health clinic capacity to quantify nurses? trade-off between patients treated and time spent
with each patient, which we treat as a proxy for a quality v. quantity decision. We provide
evidence that these small and generally insignificant effects on nurse time favor public sector
employees prioritizing quality of each interaction over clearing the patient queue.
iii
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Chapter 1
The Direct and Indirect Effects of
Employment Behavior on Body
Weight
1.1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, Americans have grown substantially heavier. The obesity
rate among U.S. adults has almost tripled since 1980 and reached 39.8% in 2015-2016. The
extreme obesity rate increased substantially from 0.9% in 1960-1962 to 8.1% in 2013-2014.1
This problem extends beyond the U.S.. The World Health Organization has referred to
this phenomenon as ’an escalating global epidemic of overweight and obesity’.2 Obesity not
only poses serious health risks to individuals (including several chronic diseases and lower life
expectancy) and worsens labor market results, but also incurs great financial costs to society.3
Concurrent with changes in the obesity rates, the distribution of occupations and individuals’
daily activities in the workplace have changed. The share of jobs in manufacturing has
1National Health Examination Survey and National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys.
2http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/obesity/en/
3[12, 47, 80, 61, 6, 44]
1
dropped from 25% to less than 10% in the past five decades and jobs in professional and
business services, leisure and hospitality have increased considerably.4 On average, jobs have
become less physically demanding.5
Ultimately, body weight is the result of choices on calorie intake and calorie
expenditure. However, there may be a number of channels through which an individual’s
job may affect one’s body weight. The nature of one’s job directly affects one’s calorie
expenditure in the workplace, and thus, affects one’s body weight. One’s occupation also
determines the constraints one faces when allocating money and time for off-work decisions
regarding food and exercise, which also affect body weight. For example, an individual with a
sedentary but stressful job may choose to eat at a restaurant and spend some time exercising
instead of preparing a meal at home.
Job requirements are the result of a choice. Individuals choose their occupation based
on preferences and constraints. For example, an individual may choose a more physical
job and choose to engage in calorie burning behavior because he likes physical activity.
Thus, it is important to control for selection into occupation and the unobserved individual
heterogeneity when I investigate how one’s occupation affects body weight.
Several previous studies have investigated the effects of occupation on body weight
often with conflicting evidence.6 [55] find job-related exercise reduces male workers’ body
weight significantly. It has been shown that having a more physical job (e.g. a blue-collar
job) is associated with worse health outcomes [63, 39, 70, 85, 79]. Contrary to what one
would expect, given the physical nature of the job, blue-collar work early in life is associated
with increased probabilities of obesity in later life [54, 73]. Also, longer working hours have
been linked with increased body weight [24, 1]. While evidence suggests that what people do
4U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
5[21] show that occupation-related energy expenditure has decreased more than 100 calories per day for
both men and women in the past five decades.
6Researchers have suggested a wide range of economic reasons to explain the rise in obesity. Results
are mixed and inconsistent. These causes include: lowered price of food [56, 33, 25, 4], participation in
government’s food subsidy programs [52, 82], lower education [26, 22], macroeconomic conditions [81, 18, 29]
and lower income for women, but not for men [84, 14]. See [13] for a comprehensive review.
2
at work is related to their body weight, that evidence is mixed and often omits key channels.
It is still not clear what the transmission mechanism of the effect of employment behavior
on body weight is and I try to address it in this paper.
This paper estimates the direct and indirect effects of individuals’ employment choices
on body weight. Direct effects are defined as effects directly attributable to the requirements
of the job. I refer to indirect effects as those resulting from the employment choices on off-
work choices regarding food and exercise. To that end, I formulate a dynamic model in
which, in each period, a forward-looking individual chooses an occupation and decides how
to allocate money and time to maximize his expected present discounted utility. At the
end of each period, his body weight updates as a result of his decisions and enters the next
period. The primary data source is the geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
With this dataset, for over a decade, I not only observe the same individuals’ occupations,
wages, body weight, spending on food eaten at home, food eaten away from home, exercise,
and other very detailed lifestyle data; I also know where individuals are located and I use
their community characteristics and local job market characteristics as exclusion restrictions
when estimating the model.
Unlike previous studies, I find insignificant direct and indirect effects of job require-
ments on body weight. My estimation shows that individuals compensate for changes in the
workplace by changing their food and exercise choices. For example, when stress at work
increases, individuals work fewer hours, eat at home less and exercise less and that is why I see
an insignificant indirect effect of stress on body weight. The social and physical requirements
of occupations have the opposite effects on food and exercise to stress, and the composite
indirect effect on body weight is also insignificant. The finding that individuals compensate
for at-work physical activities has policy implications.7 Specifically, the results indicate
that interventions to make individuals lose weight in the workplace may be undone by
7Consistent with my finding, [50] do not find significant causal effects of workplace wellness programs on
health behaviors.
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compensating behaviors outside the workplace. It is very likely that the caloric expenditure
changes in the workplace can be offset by people’s off-work behavior changes.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I extend the literature
on the effects of employment decisions on body weight by modeling the individual’s demand
for exercise and food jointly with their occupational choice [24, 38, 79]. This offers possible
channels through which employment choice affects body weight. Second, occupational choice
is endogenized with respect to body weight. As outlined above, body weight is permitted to
affect occupational choice in the model. In addition, selection bias might arise if individuals
prefer certain types of tasks and preferences are correlated with body weight. For example,
if an individual prefers physical activity, he might choose a more physically demanding job
and also choose to exercise. Therefore, he is more likely to have a lower body weight.
Studies have shown that selection into occupation is important [37, 79]. My empirical
specification includes using exclusion restrictions and a flexible structure of the error term
that allows for correlation in one’s initial body weight, one’s propensity to take on jobs with
certain requirements, one’s propensity to choose certain life styles and one’s propensity to
gain weight [71]. Third, differences in body weight are likely to result from repeated small
decisions, which the dynamics of the model enables me to capture. Because body weight
affects the marginal utility of exercise and food intake, changes in job requirements that
affect contemporaneous body weight could have compounding effects in future periods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the theoretical model and
section 1.3 introduces the data. Section 1.4 describes the empirical specification. Section 1.5
discusses the results. Section 2.7 concludes the study.
1.2 Model
The theoretical model in this section motivates the empirical estimation specified in
section 1.4. It shows the timing of the agent’s decisions and describes how the individual’s
4
employment behavior affects his allocation of time and money. This section also formalizes
the direct and indirect effects of employment behavior on body weight. The model also
details the sources of identification discussed in the empirical specification.
1.2.1 Key Features of the Model
In each period t, this individual derives utility from his body weight, the requirements
of his job, leisure, consumption of a non-food aggregate and consumption of food. His
body weight is determined both by caloric expenditure at work and lifestyle behaviors (food
consumption, exercise and home production) that may be influenced by the demands of
his job. This model allows one’s employment decision in time t to influence not only his
contemporaneous utility but also his expected future utility via body weight. The timing of
an individual’s decision is described as follows:
1. At the beginning of each period the individual observes his body weight, his age, his
level of education, the size and composition of his household.
2. With this information, the individual chooses an occupation with full knowledge of
how stressful, socially and physically demanding the job is and realizes his wage.
3. Conditional on his chosen occupation and realized wage, the individual chooses how
many hours to work and allocates his money and time between food eaten at home,
food eaten away from home, hours of home production, exercise, leisure and an inedible
aggregate good.8
4. The individual’s body weight updates as a result of the requirements of his job, hours
of work and money and time allocation and is observed at the beginning of the next
period.
8I also estimated an alternative specification with hours of work moved to the first stage. Results were
not quantitatively or qualitatively different.
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1.2.2 Optimization Problem
The forward-looking individual chooses an occupation and decides how to allocate
money and time to maximize his expected present discounted lifetime utility. At the





t ). He chooses an occupation, defined by continuous measures of
physical, social and stress demands:
Jt = {Pt, St, Stt}, s.t. Pt, St, Stt ∈ [0, 1] (1.1)
and realizes his wage (ωt).
In the second stage of each period, the individual learns his budget constraints
(determined by wage). He then allocates his time between the number of hours to work
(Ht), home production (HPt), exercise (Ext), sedentary leisure (Lt). He jointly allocates
his disposable income to food consumed at home (FHt ), food consumed away from home
(FRt ), and a non-food aggregate good (Ct). The individual derives utility (or disutility) from
consumption of the aggregate good (Ct), leisure (Lt), body weight (Bt), food consumed at
home (FHt ) and food consumed away from home (F
R
t ). His utility also depends on a vector
of exogenous preference shifters (Xt) and a vector of shocks, denoted by νt. The individual’s








t ,Jt, Bt; Xt, νt)
]
(1.2)
where E is the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, and Ut(·) is the utility function.9
The individual’s body mass in the next period (Bt+1) depends on his body mass in
the current period (Bt), caloric intake (It) and expenditure (Ot), a vector of individual
characteristics that can influence the conversion of calories into body mass (Xt) and shocks
9In this section the individual subscript i is dropped for notational simplicity.
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to the body weight νBt . The body mass function is:
Bt+1 = B(Bt, It, Ot,Xt, ν
B
t ) (1.3)
Caloric intake, It is a function of amount of food consumed at home (F
H
t ) and food
consumed away from home (FRt ) that includes food from full-service restaurants and fast
food restaurants. Caloric intake is assumed to be increasing in both categories, but I assume
that food consumed at home is healthier or less energy dense [59]. Caloric expenditure, Ot
is a function of the individual’s current body weight (Bt), energy expended in the workplace






Ot = O(Bt,Jt, Ht, Ext, HPt) (1.5)
The individual allocates his disposable income on food and the non-food aggregate
good (FHt , F
R
t , Ct). The individual’s budget constraint is a function of his wages (ωt), hours
worked (Ht), unearned spousal income (Y
s




















t are the prices for food eaten at home, food eaten away from home and
the aggregate good, respectively.
The individual’s weekly time constraint is:
Ω = Ht +HPt + Lt + Ext (1.7)
where Ω is the total number of hours available in a week. Figure 1.1 shows the timing of the
individual’s decisions in each stage in period t.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the Individual’s Decisions
1.2.3 Solution
An ”occupation” is modeled as a bundle of job requirements and a wage. The demand
for job requirements (Pt, St, Stt) is a function of body weight (Bt), observable characteristics
of the individual that include age, sex, education, size and composition of his family (Xt),
community characteristics Xct such as the number of grocery stores, fast food restaurants,
bars and fitness centers in the individual’s ZIP code and the characteristics of jobs available
(Mt) in the individual’s local labor market defined at the MSA level. Specifically, Mt
includes the mean level of job requirements (physical, social and stress) and mean wage
of all the jobs at the MSA level. In the meantime, he receives a wage (ωt), drawn from
a distribution that is also a function of the above factors. See appendix A for a detailed
explanation on how the model is solved.













Once the individual chooses an occupation and realizes his wage, he allocates his budget and
time simultaneously. He chooses how many hours to work (Ht), how much time he spends
on home production (HPt) and exercise (Ext). He allocates his budget on food consumed at
home (FHt ) and food consumed away from home (F
R
t ). Conditional on his chosen occupation
and realized wage, his joint demand for hours to work, home production time, exercise,
food consumed at home and away from home is not affected by the characteristics of jobs
available in the local labor market (Mt), and is a function of his body weight, his individual
characteristics and community characteristics.
H∗t = H(Bt,Xt,X
c
t | P ∗t , S∗t , St∗t , ω∗t ) (1.12)
HP ∗t = G
H(Bt,Xt,X
c












t | P ∗t , S∗t , St∗t , ω∗t ) (1.16)
Substituting equations (1.4) and (1.5) into equation (1.3), the body mass equation can
be rewritten as the following:



















Equations (1.8)-(1.17) will be used in the empirical specification.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Description of Key Variables
The individual-level data used in this study is from the restricted version of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). PSID has been following a national representative sample
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of 5,000 families since 1968.10 Detailed information on education, family composition,
employment, income, expenditures, health and other individual characteristics has been
collected at each wave, including how individuals spend their time and money. Beginning
in 2001, individuals were asked about their health choices, including food and exercise.
Individuals are asked about exercise, how many hours they work and the number of hours
per peek they spend on home production. Respondents are asked about how much they
spend on food eaten at home and food eaten away from home. In addition, I have repeated
data on the same individuals for over a decade. The combination of the long-panel and
information on both work, food, exercise and health markers make the geo-coded PSID
uniquely and well suited for my research question. There are 4,102 individuals in my sample
and six waves of data are used in the analysis (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009) for a
total of 24,612 observations. The restricted use data also allows me to use zip codes of the
individuals to match with data that contains their community characteristics and local job
market characteristics. Community characteristics data (the number of grocery stores, the
number of bars, the number of fitness centers and the number of fast food restaurants) is from
U.S. Census Bureau’s ZipCode Business Patterns and Local job market characteristics data
(average levels of the three job requirements and the mean wage) is from Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics. Table 1.1 and 1.2 describe the key variables
mentioned in the previous section. Table 1.1 describes the ten dependent variables in the
three stages and Table 1.2 describes the individual characteristics, community characteristics
and local market characteristics.11
1.3.2 Job Requirements
The Occupational Information Network (O*NET) contains a large number of detailed
descriptors on occupations, including information on knowledge, work activities, abilities,
10https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/default.aspx
11Wage, hours of work, home production, food at home, food out and BMI are all divided by ten to
facilitate estimation. Exercise is a dummy variable where 1 indicates yes and 0 indicates no exercise.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables





Hours of work 3.562 2.051
Exercise 0.593 0.491
Home production 0.891 0.903
Food at home 1.569 0.569
Food out 0.886 0.576
BMI 2.805 0.551
Note: Some variables are scaled down to facilitate estimation.
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables and Individual Characteristics






Number of kids 0.857 1.175
Age of youngest kid 3.512 5.234
Housework wife 7.693 12.154
Lagged wife income 1.386 2.134
Community Characteristics Xct
# of Bars 3.554 5.437
# of Grocery stores 5.719 6.282
# of Fast food restaurants 1.704 1.568
# of Fitness centers 2.183 2.541
# of Full-service restaurants 1.545 1.686





Sample Size (person-year observations) 24612
Note: Education measures how many years of education one has finished.
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requirements, skills and environmental conditions. I use principle component analysis (PCA)
to convert these aspects into a tractable amount of job requirements, which include the
physical, social and stress levels of an occupation (Pt, St, Stt). I re-scale these requirements
to lie between 0 and 1. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show summary statistics of individuals’ job
requirements and local job markets’ average job requirements (defined in section 1.4).
The components with the most weight of the physical requirement index are ’indoors no
AC’, ’outdoors no cover’, ’outdoors under cover’, ’exposed to extreme temperature’, ’exposed
to extreme light’, ’confined space work’ and ’exposed whole body vibration’. Top occupations
with this index include oil derrick operators, mobile heavy equipment operators, structural
steel workers, insulation workers and millwrights. Factors that contribute the most to the
social requirement index are ’leadership’, ’instructing’, ’negotiation’, ’persuasion’ and ’social
perceptiveness’. Top occupations with the social requirement are clergy, CEO’s, arbitrators,
counseling psychologists, and psychiatrists. For the stress requirement, most important
contributing factors include ’responsibility for others’ health and safety’, ’responsibility for
outcomes and results’ and ’consequence of error’. Top occupations with the stress index are
ship caption, offshore rig drill operators, EMT/paramedic, surgeons and pharmacists.
In order to answer my primary research question, there must be sufficient variation in
job requirements year over year. Figure 1.2 depicts how job requirements change over time
in my data. Figure 1.2a shows that changes in social and stress have a similar distribution,
while physical does not change as much over time. Figures 1.2b, 1.2c and 1.2d show changes
of each requirement by wave. Changes are mostly stable over time. My data shows that, on
average, 50% of the sample changes their occupation in each wave.12
12According to Bureau of Labor Economics, the median of employee tenure was 4.2 years
(https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm). My data is bi-annual and it shows that about half
of the individuals change their occupation every other year. That means on average, they change their
occupation every 4 years. I admit that the frequency of changing an occupation is not the same as employee
tenure, but they are highly correlated and this provides a reasonable check on my data.
12
(a) All Waves (b) How Physical Changes by Wave
(c) How Social Changes by Wave (d) How Stress Changes by Wave
NOTE: Changes are calculated by subtracting requirements of the previous wave from the
current wave.
Figure 1.2: Changes of Job Requirements Over Time
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1.4 Empirical Model
The goal of the analysis is to investigate the direct and indirect causal effects of
occupational choice on body mass. The solution to the model in the previous section
provides the basis for the empirical specifications. In the first stage, the individual chooses
an occupation and realizes his wage (equations (1.8)-(1.11)). In the next stage, the individual
makes simultaneous decisions on how many hours to work, the amount of home production,
exercise, food eaten at home and food eaten away from home (equations (1.12)-(1.16)). Note
that conditional on a chosen occupation and realized wages, his second stage decisions are
not affected by the characteristics of jobs available in his local job market (Mt). In the last
stage, his body mass evolves as shown in equation (1.17). Conditional on all the choices he
has made in the previous stages, his body mass does not depend on the characteristics of jobs
available in the local job market (Mt) or the individual’s community characteristics (X
c
t);
rather those factors only affect BMI by affecting the individuals’s demand for the outcome
variables of interest.
Identification
Empirically, identification of the joint decisions requires exogenous variables which are
correlated with the joint decision outcomes, but uncorrelated with the error in the body
mass equation after controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. Note that the individual’s
occupation choice in the first stage is a function of characteristics of jobs available in the
local job market defined at the MSA level (defined as a vector of average job requirements).
However, conditional on his chosen occupation and realized wage, his second-stage choices
are no longer a function of characteristics of the local job market. Nor is his body weight
in the last stage. Furthermore, conditional on all his first and second stage decisions, his
body weight is not affected by characteristics of the local community (the number of fast
food restaurants, bars, fitness centers and grocery stores). Thus, the average physical, social
14
and stress levels of the local job market Mt and characteristics of the local community X
c
t
jointly serve as identification for the model. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of the exercise
equation (exercise is a binary variable) and the timing of body mass (body mass in the last
period t− 1 enters estimation in the current period t) help ensure the vector of parameters
that solve the system of equations is unique.
Discrete Factor Random Effects
If there are unobserved individual characteristics that affect one’s occupation choice
and are also correlated with body weight, estimates that do not address this correlation will
lead to bias. For example, if an individual has a strong preference for social activity, he might
choose a more socially intensive job and may be more likely to eat out with friends or join
other social events after work and maybe has less time for exercise. On the other hand, if an
individual strongly dislikes social activity, he might choose an occupation that is less socially
intensive, decide to eat at home and maybe use his time to exercise more after work. To
address the issue of selection on the basis of unobservables, a flexible random effects discrete
factor estimation approach that allows for correlation in the unobservables that affect each
expression including initial body weight (see discussion below), the propensity to choose jobs
with certain requirements, the propensity to make certain life styles (e.g., choice of food and
exercise) and the propensity to gain weight.
The discrete factor estimation approach [48, 71] treats the unobserved heterogeneity
components as a discrete distribution and approximate these components as a joint step-wise
function. The relaxed distributional assumptions about the error terms are an advantage of
this approach. There are two types of unobserved heterogeneity components. The first is an
unobserved permanent heterogeneity component. An individual’s ability or type may be an
example. The second component is a time-varying one that may include a shock to one’s
emotional well-being that affects the joint outcomes observed in a given period. The error
15
terms in each equation are decomposed as follows:
εijt = µj + νjt + εijt (1.18)
where εjit is the error term for equation j, µj and νjt capture the permanent and time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity, respectively and εjit is the remaining idiosyncratic component of
the error term. Conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity factors, the likelihood function
value is calculated by taking expectations over the distribution of the first two components.
Initial Conditions and Likelihood Function
Due to the dynamic nature of the model, body weight B1 and education E1 in
the first period affect the individual’s all subsequent decisions. However, they cannot
be modeled within the dynamic structure because I do not observe data in the previous
period. Thus, I estimate the initial conditions with reduced form equations and allow for
correlation in the unobservables between initial body weight and the individual’s choices.
An individuals parents’ education levels serve as the exclusion restrictions for the initial
conditions. Empirically, these two equations are jointly estimated with the system of
equations discussed previously.
The unconditional likelihood function for individual i is
16
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(1.19)
where Θ and θ are the vector of variables to be estimated in the model and in each
equation, respectively. L is the number of time-varying mass points and K is the number of





Coefficients from the jointly estimated twelve equations are reported in Table 1.3-1.6.
The likelihood ratio test shows that the exogenous variables (community characteristics and
local job market characteristics) are jointly significant. As shown in Table 1.3, in the first
stage, body mass positively contributes to a more social occupation, but not the to the
physical or stress requirements of an occupation or wage. Age does not affect one’s wage or
how one chooses occupation, but education, gender, marital status and age of the youngest
kid all have some effects on one’s employment choice.
Next, Table 1.4 shows estimation results of the second-stage variables. Recall that the
individual chooses how to allocate time and money in this stage. Because job requirements
affect body weight indirectly through these choices, I look at the effects of each job
requirement on these as a group. Here I interpret the effects of social as an example.
Estimation for hours of work shows that having a more social occupation increases the
number of hours one would work, but the effect is smaller for individuals with higher
body mass. Home production is not significantly affected by social. Having a more social
occupation significantly increases the probability one would exercise, but the effect is smaller
for individuals with higher body mass. When it comes to food, social has a positive and
significant effect on food eaten at home, and the effect gets smaller for individuals with
higher body mass. However, social does not affect food eaten away from home significantly.
Physical has a similar effect on these exercise and food choices with social and stress affects
most of these choices on the opposite direction.
Lastly, Table 1.5 reports results for the BMI equation. One variable to note is lagged
BMI. It shows that body mass is highly autoregressive. Education is negatively associated
with BMI, which is consistent with the literature. As one would expect, exercise is also
negatively associated with body mass. Spending more on food out significantly increases
18
Table 1.3: Stage One Regression Results
Outcome



































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Stage Two Regression Results
Outcome










































































































































































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Initial Condition Regression Results
Outcome




















































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%,
** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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one’s body mass, which confirms that eating out, on average, makes one consume more
calories. There is no overall effect of either hours of work or social, but there is a negative
cross-over effect of the two on BMI.
1.5.2 Marginal Effects
Table 1.7 presents the marginal effects of job requirements (physical, social and stress)
on body weight when I increase job requirements by one unit. As previously defined, directs
effects are effects from direct caloric expenditure in the workplace and indirect effects are
effects through off-work channels regarding one’s food and exercise choices. Total effects are
direct and indirect effects combined. Direct effects of physical and social on body weight are
both negative, but insignificant. Stress has an insignificant positive effect on body weight.13
The magnitude of this effect implies a 2-3 pounds of weight increase in two years for an
adult from increasing stress by one standard deviation. On the other hand, calculated
indirect marginal effects are all statistically insignificant. Total effects of job requirements
on body weight are, therefore, insignificant as well.
A closer look at the second and third stage results offers an explanation to the result.
As shown in Table 1.5, exercise, hours of work, home production and food at home have
a negative effect on body weight and food out has a positive effect on body weight. Table
1.7 shows marginal effects of job requirements on these second-stage choices. For example,
more stress leads to less food at home, food out and exercise, more home production and
fewer hours of work. The composite effect of all the behavioral change does not influence
body weight significantly. Similarly for physical and social, they affect one’s second-stage
choices in such a way that the net combined effects are not significant. Job requirements do
not affect body weight because individuals compensate for changes in the work place with
changes in their food and exercise behavior off-work.
13https://www.cell.com/cell-metabolism/fulltext/S1550-4131(18)30190-6 explains how stress alone could
lead to weight gain without any behavioral change.
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Table 1.7: Marginal Effects of Job Requirements on Body Weight and Second-stage
Dependent Variables
Job requirement



























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%,
** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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1.5.3 Robustness Checks
To address possible simultaneous bias, a robustness check is carried out by adding
lagged choice variables (lagged food at home, lagged food out and lagged exercise) as state
variables. Regression results and marginal effects are presented in tables B.1 to B.5. The
estimation results are very similar. I also get very similar marginal effects except for the
effects of job requirements on food at home where there are a few flipped signs. It shows
that my estimation is robust.
1.6 Discussion
This paper investigates an empirical question: how do job requirements affect body
weight? I show job requirements can affect one’s body weight directly and indirectly. Direct
effects are the effects of caloric expenditure in the work place. Indirect effects are effects on
body weight through off-work channels. I formulate a dynamic model in which an individual
chooses his occupation and realizes his wage, and subsequently allocates time and money to
maximize lifetime utility and his body weight updates as a result. I estimate the solution of
the model with data from PSID and other sources. My empirical identification includes the
use of exclusion restrictions and a flexible error structure.
Unlike previous studies, I do not find significant effects of job requirements on body
weight. I show that individuals compensate for changes in the workplace by adjusting
their off-work food and exercise behaviors. For example, when the physical requirement
of work increases, individuals work more hours, eat at home more and exercise more and
that is why I see an insignificant indirect effect of physical on body weight. My results
have important policy implications. My results indicate that interventions in the workplace
to make individuals lose weight may be undone by compensating behaviors outside the
workplace. It is very likely that the caloric expenditure changes in the workplace can be
offset by people’s off-work behavior changes.
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My findings raise some interesting questions for future work. It is a documented fact
that the U.S. population has been getting heavier over the years. I show that workplace is
not to blame for this. Then what is causing it? What makes people choose to behave in such
ways that they are gain weight over time? I show that people may choose to compensate
for changes in the workplace, then how can I design policy interventions to nudge people
not to change their off-work behavior? Another thing is in my data. I only observe people’s
weekly spending on food at home and food away from home. As shown in [46], spending on
food is not the equivalence of calorie intake, even though it is a good proxy. It would be
interesting to better understand how job requirements affect individuals’ choice on calorie
intake in future work as well.
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Chapter 2
Capacity Constraints and Provider
Preferences: Evidence from Public
Health Clinics
2.1 Introduction
The public labor force is a large component of the economies of most developed
countries. Over 15 percent of the labor force is employed in the public sector in the U.S., and
payroll expenses account for approximately half of all state government expenditures [75, 45].
Many of these workers are engaged in the production of labor-intensive services. For example,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, six of the ten most common occupations for
government workers include: clerks, postal service workers, repair workers, highway workers,
corrections officers, and (most importantly for this paper) registered nurses.
Most service providers, in both the public and private sector, face inherently stochastic
demand but cannot store inventory. Suppliers therefore tend to carry excess capacity
on a median day [31]; however, the presence of excess capacity is heavily influenced not
only by stochastic fluctuations in demand but also variations funding. Such variation in
27
capacity constraints due to funding is a particularly salient issue for public services, where
debates over funding levels and threats of budget cuts are regular occurrences with important
consequences. For example, DeAngelo and Hansen [28] show that when budget cuts forced
layoffs of State Troopers in Oregon, traffic fatalities increased. Other work examining
law enforcement show that capacity constraints do affect the provision of public services,
providing evidence that greater funding for law enforcement decreases crime [35, 15, 69].
Given that capacity constraints affect outcomes related the provision of public services,
how do employees respond when capacity constraints bind and prices cannot adjust?1
Understanding how providers of public services reallocate their time when demand exceeds
capacity (or vice versa) is critical for understanding how changes in funding for the provision
of public services will affect outcomes of interest. In a for-profit setting, we expect that
employees will respond in some way consistent with the profit maximization of the firm, or
respond to the incentives in place to alleviate principal agent problems. However, there is a
large body of work showing that employees in non-profit and public settings fundamentally
differ from workers who select into for-profit employment, making the response of public
sector employees ex ante less clear [78, 58, 5, 65, 77, 30, 10].
In this paper, we provide evidence on how service workers in the public sector respond
to capacity constraints, focusing specifically in the context of public health clinics. We
examine how nurses in public health clinics respond to unexpectedly tight time constraints
created by exogenous temporary reductions in staff. When demand spikes and capacity is
constrained, how much time with the average patient are providers willing to trade-off to
see as many patients as possible? While the specific answer within this context can inform
about the amount of median excess capacity built into the provision of public clinical services,
more broadly this paper examines how providers of public services make quality v. quantity
tradeoffs under binding time constraints. For example, if providers are reluctant to reduce
the time spent with patients, and leaving patients untreated has a high social cost, then
1Prior work has examined the effects of congestion (i.e., capacity constraints) under different levels of
demand in the transportation industry, and when prices are efficient allocation mechanisms [11, 27, 9, 67].
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ensuring median day excess capacity in the public provision of clinical services can yield
significant welfare gains [49]. While leaving patients untreated creates obvious negative
externalities, particularly if they are in the clinic for communicable illness, a reduction in
time spent with each patient may also negatively affect the quality of care.2
We identify the causal effects of reductions in capacity through a series of repeated, but
not periodic, exogenous temporary reductions in the number of nurses working in a given
clinic on a given day. Our data were provided by the Knox County Health Department
(KCHD) in Tennessee and are comprised of time records for each patient visit in five public
health clinics over sixteen months. In addition to providing certain types of health care in
the clinic, KCHD is also responsible for administering FluMist vaccines in public schools.
On days when KCHD is administering FluMist, two nurses would be removed from typical
clinical duties and sent to the particular school for the morning, leaving clinics short-staffed
with reduced operating capacity for the first half of the day.
The selection and timing of FluMist administration is plausibly exogenous to the
demand or expected patient volume for a given clinic. For example, all scheduling
decisions were made by the KCHD central office without consulting the clinics and with no
compensating actions taken by the central office. Clinics that were selected for FluMist on
a given day were instructed to keep all scheduled visits and were prohibited from otherwise
increasing their staffing levels on FluMist days. Indeed, we were asked to examine these
data by KCHD because the effects of FluMist administration on clinical production were
unknown. KCHD wanted to know if their current practices in conducting FluMist had any
adverse effects on their clinical mission. We therefore contend that FluMist-induced staffing
shortages are exogenous to the scheduled daily activity of a given clinic, and the number
of their scheduled patients was not influenced by the staff shortage. We expand on these
institutional details and provide empirical evidence on the exogeneity of FluMist days in
Section 2.2.
2See, for example, [89], [87], [72], and [68], among others.
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Our empirical analysis exploits these reductions in clinic staff, along with unexpectedly
high-demand days, to quantify a provider’s trade-off between patients seen versus time with
each patient. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we quantify the effects of reductions in
clinic staff on provider behaviors and specific components of the clinic visit. A simple event
study of daily clinic visits and other aggregate measures of clinic behaviors surrounding
FluMist days shows an abrupt reduction in capacity on FluMist days. Our regression
analysis of provider-days further confirms that nurses removed for FluMist administration
see significantly fewer patients, thereby reducing overall clinic capacity. We also find that
providers in affected clinics (who are not administering FluMist) decrease their share of walk-
in patients, indicating they are prioritizing those patients with scheduled appointments. At
the visit level, when clinic capacity is reduced, average total visit time significantly decreases
by 7% (or about 5 minutes). This primarily occurred through a reduction in check-in and
check-out times, with small (and insignificant) reductions in time with nurses.
Next, we consider the underlying mechanisms that may drive our estimated effects. To
guide our analysis, we construct an expository theoretical model of providers’ responses to
staff reductions, where we posit that a provider’s utility is a function of the number of patients
seen and the amount of time spent with each patient, relative to some threshold ‘sufficient’
visit length. We derive comparative statics showing that the optimal amount of time that
providers spend with patients is a function of the relative importance of visit length versus
number of patients seen and the stochastic arrival rate of patients, among other parameters.
In the context of our theoretical model, the null effects on provider time with patients are
reflective of providers’ preference for time spent with each patient over the number of patients
seen. We then conduct additional analyses to test whether our results are plausibly driven by
provider preferences or simply a reflection of existing excess clinic capacity. For example, we
estimate unconditional quantile regressions allowing for differential effects along the support
of daily visit volumes. Even on the busiest days (upwards of the 75th percentile of visit
volume) when capacity constraints are likely binding, nurses never reduce their time with
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each patient by more than 5%. We interpret the inelasticity of time spent with patients
as indicative of provider preferences; however, we acknowledge that our findings may be
partially driven by the structural constraints of the provider-patient interaction.3
Focusing on a specific institution and context allows for a strong identification strategy
and thus aids our causal analysis. This ultimately improves the internal validity of our
analysis, but potentially at the expense of generalizability. Nonetheless, we contend that
our results are at least partially generalizable to other public provided services, particularly
those where demand is stochastic. For example, during the government shut down in the
winter of 2018-2019, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees called out
sick, and public reports suggested significantly longer queues for airline passengers. TSA
officials therefore appear to have made the choice to maintain (or at least approximate)
pre-existing screening standards rather than more quickly clear the queue of passengers.
Additional areas where employees engaged in the provision of services to the public may
exhibit similar responses include postal service, guidance counselors in public schools, public
defenders, and rehabilitation facilities. While some of these entities are more leanly funded
than others, the effects of budget cuts or increases to any of these services depends on how
providers manage tradeoffs between quality of service and customers served. Our analysis
and conceptual framework may offer insights into future studies in these other important
areas.
Our study offers three distinct contributions to the literature. First, our investigation of
how public service workers adjust their time allocation in response to reductions in capacity
is novel.4 Most prior relevant work in the health sector focuses on excess capacity and
provider response to stochastic demand in the hospital and long-term care settings [41, 43,
3In other words, providers may truly be unable, rather than unwilling, to shorten visit lengths to clear
the waiting room. In either case, the empirical and policy implications of our results for reducing clinic
capacity are the same.
4In studies of other industries, understaffing has been found to be related to lower levels of performance at
the group level in professional and trade occupations [42], a decline in the positive experiences and increased
workload stress in an educational service setting [92], and less than optimal sales and profitability in stores
[64].
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53, 49, 86] or providers’ acceptance of patients and time spent with each patient in emergency
departments [16, 17]. Recent work from [40] examines changes in physician behavior due
to increased time pressures in the clinic, exploiting variation in patient volumes to identify
responses of primary care physicians within the day. Our analysis is similar in spirit, albeit
with a different source of identification (a reduction in nurse staffing levels in the clinic) and
a different care setting (public vs. private). There are also reasons to suspect that workers
in the public and private sectors may respond very differently to reduced capacity. For
example, Dixit [32] discusses how incentives and competition can inefficiently distort worker
effort and performance in the public sector.5
Second, most prior work on exogenous capacity changes in health care settings focuses
on increased capacity rather than reduced capacity. For example, there have been a number
of studies that exploit regulation changes in required staffing/patient ratios as exogenous
shocks to staffing levels and investigate the effects of the regulation change, with mixed
findings.6 In addition, previous studies that prompted such regulation change have been
criticized for problems including omitted variable bias and endogeneity of staffing levels
[34].7 To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effects of exogenously
decreased staffing levels on time spent with patients and number of patients seen.
Finally, whereas prior work often examines permanent regulation-induced changes in
staffing levels, we study the effects of temporary staffing decreases. For example, previous
studies have linked ‘lower than target’ nurse staffing levels and higher patient turnover with
higher mortality rate on a daily basis [74, 83]. Our results indicate that effects of staff
reductions were strongest on days with the largest patient volume, which suggests that
5The public health setting is important in its own right as over 20 million people currently receive primary
and preventative health care at community health centers [51]. Additionally, capacity constraints may have
differential effects when the constraint is on labor, rather than capital (beds), or when the need for treatment
is more/less urgent. Unlike emergency departments, most patients to public health clinics will survive until
the next day if untreated, in which case providers in health clinics may place more weight on time with
patients over maximizing the number of patients seen in a timely manner.
6[20], [8], [76], [88], [2], and [60] found quality of care increased in at least one dimension, while [34], [66],
and [23] found no change in quality of care.
7Variation across hospitals that could not all be captured might contribute to quality of care, or patients
admitted during the weekend tend to have more severe conditions than those admitted during the week.
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estimates derived from a permanent capacity change may mask larger effects on critical
days.
2.2 Data and Institutional Details
Data were provided by the Knox County Health Department (KCHD) in Tennessee
and are comprised of time records for each patient visit in five public health clinics over 16
months and two flu seasons. Each individual record was documented by clinic staff in an
electronic patient record, where we observe the date of the visit, the initiation of the visit
(scheduled or walk-in), the location (clinic) of the visit, the age range of the patient, and the
unique provider/nurse ID for each visit. We also observed detailed time stamps for different
stages of each visit, including: 1) Check-in time, the time between signing in and being taken
to a treatment room; 2) Ready Nurse time, the time spent in the treatment room awaiting a
nurse; 3) Nurse time, the time spent from the start of the consultation to the conclusion of
any treatment; and 4) Ready Check-Out time, the time between the conclusion of treatment
and when the patient leaves.
KCHD provides many services to the community, including health education, aware-
ness, vaccinations, and clinical services. Clinical services in the KCHD health clinics, the
focus of this paper, are provided almost exclusively by registered nurses (RNs) rather than
physicians. In addition, KCHD administers FluMist vaccines to public school children in
Knox County, typically in October, November, or December. On FluMist days, two RNs are
pulled from a subset of the five main clinics to administer FluMist in schools, subsequently
reducing capacity in the nurse’s clinic during that time. On a FluMist day, nurses on FluMist
duty were away the whole morning and would return to work in the clinics in the afternoon.
In total, our data consist of 42,514 visits to five public health clinics from September
2014 through January 2016. Approximately 6% of our observed visits occurred on a FluMist
day. Overall summary statistics are provided in Table 2.1, where we present statistics for all
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clinic visits in the first column and statistics by FluMist/Non-FluMist days in columns 2 and
3, respectively. Statistics at the clinic level are summarized in the top panel of Table 2.1,
with statistics on individual components of each visit in panel 2 and general patient/visit
characteristics in panel 3.
As shown in panel 1, clinics saw around 25 patients on average per day, where
approximately 33% of visits were scheduled and 67% were walk-ins. From panel 2 of Table
2.1, clinic visits last around 73 minutes on average, with shorter visit lengths of 66 minutes
on FluMist days. Time spent with nurses is the most time consuming aspect of a visit,
with average nurse times of around 30 minutes. Nurse time and ready check-out times
were comparable on FluMist days relative to non-FluMist days, while check-in times and
ready nurse times were shorter. Finally, panel 3 of Table 2.1 presents the percentage of
patients in different age groups as well as the percentage of different reasons for the visit,
the day of the visit, and the clinic. These statistics suggest that the age distribution across
patients is similar between FluMist and non-FluMist days, as is the underlying reason for
the patient visit. We also see that FluMist days are not isolated to specific days of the week
or disproportionately concentrated among a single clinic.
2.2.1 FluMist Administration
Two key features of the administration of FluMist vaccinations are useful in establishing
FluMist as an exogenous source of temporary reductions in clinic capacity. First, nurses
pulled from the clinic to administer FluMist in schools were not replaced by nurses from
other clinics or temporary staff. Second, all scheduling decisions of FluMist days were made
by the KCHD central office without consulting the clinic. When a clinic was selected for a
FluMist day, the staff who remained were instructed to maintain their scheduling patterns
and staffing levels. In other words, clinics that had RNs out at schools were told to treat
the day like a normal day – but with fewer clinicians.10
10It is also worth noting that there were no compensating actions taken in any way by the central office.
We were asked to examine the visit level data from KCHD because the consequences of these short-staffing
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Clinic Visits8
Overall FluMist Days Non-FluMist Days
Total Clinic Days (N=1,713 with 101 FluMist observations)
Total Visits 24.82 26.86 24.69
(11.03) (9.85) (11.09)
Scheduled Visits 8.07 10.06 7.96
(8.96) (9.55) (8.91)
Walk-in Visits 16.74 16.80 16.74
(10.68) (11.74) (10.62)
Components of Visit Length (N=42,514 with 2,713 FluMist observations)
Total Visit Time 72.61 66.35 72.98
(49.99) (43.22) (50.34)
Check-in Time 11.25 10.23 11.31
(14.04) (10.03) (14.24)
Ready-nurse Time 10.65 9.76 10.71
(17.83) (13.54) (18.08)
Nurse Time 30.61 30.09 30.64
(28.70) (24.71) (28.95)
Ready-check-out Time 14.45 14.35 14.45
(28.62) (28.90) (28.61)
Visit/Patient Characteristics (%) (N=42,514 with 2,713 FluMist observations)
Age Range
0-10 yrs 18.32 20.32 18.19
11-20 yrs 20.72 17.18 20.96
21-30 yrs 26.53 26.40 26.54
31-40 yrs 15.70 15.86 15.69
41-50 yrs 7.96 7.89 7.97
51-60 yrs 5.45 6.23 5.39
61-70 yrs 3.45 3.87 3.43
71-80 yrs 1.44 1.55 1.44
81+ 0.42 0.70 0.40
Reason for Visit9
Immunization 33.48 37.82 33.19
STD Screen/Treat 16.79 22.12 16.42
Depo-Provera 5.95 4.83 6.03
Back-to-School Immunization 5.04 n/a 5.35
Travel Immunization 4.84 4.57 4.86
Day of Visit
Monday 21.45 22.74 21.36
Tuesday 21.70 18.43 21.92
Wednesday 18.41 12.75 18.79
Thursday 19.30 22.67 19.07
Friday 19.15 23.41 18.86
Clinic Visited
CDC 24.07 32.10 23.52
KCTE 9.96 7.96 10.10
KCWE 18.19 16.48 18.31
KCWH 22.35 16.00 22.78
TIC 25.43 27.46 25.29
days with respect to quality of care or production of public health were not understood. The central office
wanted to know what (if any) compensating actions should be taken.
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While the institutional details of FluMist administration suggest that staffing reduc-
tions were indeed exogenous, it is of course possible that clinics anticipated the FluMist
days and adjusted accordingly. We therefore consider a series of event studies that examine
daily clinic patterns for the days immediately surrounding a FluMist day. By design, our
event studies are not regression-based and instead reflect basic descriptive statistics over
time. The purpose of these event studies is twofold: 1) to illustrate the reduction in capacity
from FluMist administration; and 2) to examine whether clinics anticipated the staffing
reductions in some way and adjusted their behaviors leading up to FluMist days. Results
are summarized in Figure 2.1, where we present statistics for clinic visits (total, scheduled,
and walk-in) and total minutes spent in each stage of a visit, including nurse-patient time,
check-in time and check-out time for each day within two business days of a FluMist day.
Figure 2.1a depicts total daily visit volume at the clinic level for +/- 2 business days
surrounding a FluMist Day. For each of the two days before and after a FluMist day, the
clinic sees an average of 25.8 patients. But on FluMist days, the clinic sees an average of 21.8
patients, which represents more than a 15% decrease in total patient volume. Figures 2.1b
and 2.1c plot total daily visit volume for scheduled visits and walk-in visits, respectively.
There is some descriptive evidence that providers in FluMist clinics may anticipate these
FluMist days by scheduling (on average) one fewer appointment on FluMist days than
neighboring days; however, clinics selected for FluMist see 3.5 fewer walk-in patients on
a FluMist day than neighboring days. The fact that the reduction in total visits is primarily
driven by decreased walk-in volume indicates that FluMist days do indeed reduce clinic
capacity.11
We also examine how FluMist days differ from adjacent days in terms of total time
patients spend with their providers and in administrative components of the visit such as
11This comparison differs somewhat from the overall summary statistics in Table 2.1, where we see more
scheduled visits on an average FluMist day and a comparable number of walk-in visits relative to an average
non-FluMist day; however, the comparison group of days in this event study is only for days immediately
surrounding FluMist days rather than all non-FluMist days over the sample period. The numbers reflected
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check-in and check-out times. Figure 2.1d shows that on FluMist days, patients collectively
spend a total of 570 minutes with nurses throughout the day compared to 725 minutes with
nurses on adjacent days. Consistent with the overall reduction in total visits, this abrupt
decrease in total nurse-patient minutes on FluMist days is reflective of a reduction in clinic
capacity on those days.
In summary, these figures provide descriptive evidence that FluMist days reduce total
clinic capacity. To the extent that providers are able to anticipate the effects of FluDays,
they are only able to slightly adjust the demands placed on the clinic via small reductions in
scheduled visits. Walk-in visits account for about two-thirds of total visit volume, and three-
fourths of the drop in patients seen is due to decreases in walk-in patients. Nonetheless, these
preliminary takeaways are purely descriptive and based on simple clinic means. In subsequent
sections, we turn to regression methods to examine how nurses respond to reduced capacity
and tighter time constraints when controlling for a rich set of patient, clinic, visit, and
provider characteristics.
2.3 Initial Evidence on the Effects of Capacity Reduc-
tions
We first provide initial evidence of the average effect of FluMist days on various
activities at both the provider and visit level, respectively. This analysis provides another
reasonableness check that FluMist administration does indeed reduce clinic activity among
those nurses directly impacted. We then further show the effects of FluMist days on nurses
that remain in the clinic (i.e., nurses that were exposed to a reduction in capacity but where
not removed from the clinic for FluMist administration). Details of these analyses and
findings are discussed throughout the remainder of this section.
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2.3.1 Provider-level Analysis
For our provider-level analysis, we construct a panel of provider/days and estimate the
following fixed effects model:
yit = α + βnFluNurse+ βdFluDay + µi + νc + ηd + γm + δy + εit. (2.1)
We denote daily output for a given clinician (nurse) i at time t by yit, measured as log
numbers of scheduled visits, log number and share of walk-ins, and log time spent with
patients. The variable FluNurse is an indicator set to one for a particular nurse if he or she
was on FluMist duty on that day. Similarly, we form a FluDay indicator that takes a value
of one if any nurse from that clinic administered FluMist on that day. Therefore, if provider
i from clinic c is on FluMist duty on a given day, both the FluNurse and FluDay indicators
are set to 1. Meanwhile, if some other provider ( ¬i ∈ c) from i’s clinic is on FluMist
duty, then FluDay will equal 1 but FluNurse will be 0. From the provider’s perspective, the
indicator for FluDay therefore implies an increase in the expected number of patients to be
seen by each each provider who remains in the clinic on a FluMist day. We estimate this
model using a fixed effects “within-estimator” at the nurse level, also including fixed effects
for each clinic (νc), day of week (ηd), month of year (γm), and year (δy).
12 Standard errors
are clustered at the nurse level.
Table 2.2 presents our provider-level estimates of the average effects of FluMist-induced
staff reductions on nurses’ daily production. Column (1) presents the estimated effect from
being called out of the clinic to administer FluMist on a given day. These estimates are
based on the full sample. Column (2) presents estimates on the effect of a FluMist day
among nurses who were not removed from the clinic on that day. The estimates in column
(1) of Table 2.2 therefore provide a reasonableness check for our provider-level analysis, as
these estimates reflect changes to behaviors specifically for nurses who are removed from the
12Among other things, the inclusion of nurse fixed effects captures any potential selection at the clinic
level with regard to which nurses are ultimately pulled from the clinic to administer the FluMist vaccine.
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Table 2.2: Results for Provider-level Analysisa
FluNurse FluDayb
Log Nurse Minutes -0.439*** 0.063
(0.061) (0.046)
Log Total Visits -0.446*** 0.061*
(0.049) (0.033)
Log Walk-in Visits -0.346*** -0.001
(0.070) (0.037)
Log Scheduled Visits -0.343*** 0.095*
(0.071) (0.053)
Walk-in Share 0.113** -0.089**
(0.050) (0.038)
aResults from a “within-estimator” with provider-level fixed effects. Column (1) reflects estimates
for the coefficient on FluNurse based on the full sample. Column (2) presents estimates for the
coefficient on FluDay when limiting the sample only to non-FluMist nurses. Different outcomes are
presented in each row. Additional covariates excluded from the table include indicator variables for
the clinic, day of the week, month of the year, and year. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at
the nurse level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
bEstimates based on nurses who were in the clinic all day (i.e., excluding nurses who left the
office to administer FluMist).
clinic to administer the FluMist vaccines. Since FluMist nurses typically spend a little less
than half of their day out of the clinic, our estimates that total time spent with patients
and total patients seen decreases by around 45% for FluMist nurses are in-line with a priori
expectations. We also find that being scheduled for FluMist increases the nurse’s share of
walk-in patients relative to scheduled patients. This is consistent with a backlog of walk-in
patients on FluMist days, where nurses staying in the clinic prioritize scheduled patients over
walk-in patients, and upon their return to the clinic, nurses out for FluMist administration
work to alleviate the queue of walk-in patients.
The estimates in column (2) of Table 2.2 reflect the estimated effect of FluMist days on
non-FluMist nurses (i.e., the nurses that remained in the clinic for the entire day). Here, we
find a statistically significant but small increase in total visits (at the 90% confidence level)
and a significant decrease in the share of walk-in visits (at the 95% level) among non-FluMist
nurses, with the latter result again suggesting a prioritization of scheduled visits over walk-in
visits.
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These results are consistent with providers placing more value on spending a certain
amount of time with each patient relative to seeing as many patients as possible. For
example, the average clinic has around 6 nurses staffed in a given day. Typically, two nurses
are removed for the morning to administer FluMist, leaving four nurses remaining in the
clinic. The estimates for FluDay in column (2) of Table 2.2 suggest that the remaining
nurses collectively increase patient time that day by about 0.25 average-person days (6.3
percent increase, presumably of a normal day’s activity ×4 ≈ 0.25 additional person days),
see an additional 24 percent of a person-day’s equivalent of patients, and see an additional
38 percent of a person-day equivalent scheduled patients. Given that on a FluMist day,
the clinic loses nearly a full person-day of capacity (and activity), the magnitudes of these
increases do not compensate for the reduction from RNs removed from the clinic. Note also
that while the nurses who remain in the clinic may see slightly more patients, they do not
appear to be sacrificing average time with patients to do so. In summary, the sign of the
coefficients on the FluDay indicator are consistent with some form of compensating behavior,
but the estimates are often statistically insignificant and the magnitudes are insufficient to
fully compensate for the reductions in output from nurses temporarily removed from the
clinic.13
2.3.2 Visit-level Analysis
We also examine the effects of capacity reductions on the average time spent in each
stage of a visit. We adopt a similar specification as in equation 2.1, with three main
differences: 1) we include a larger set of fixed effects, including patient age (in 10-year
bands), clinic, provider, reason for visit, day of the week, month, and year; 2) we only
consider the FluDay indicator, since this indicator overlaps with the FluNurse indicator at
the visit level; and 3) our visit-level outcome measures include total visit time, check-in
13If capacity constraints are at all binding (even for just a portion of the time), some compensating
behavior is to be expected. The job of these providers is to manage demands on the clinic as a whole rather
than demand for their specific personal services.
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minutes, waiting room time, nurse minutes, and check-out minutes (all in logs), as well as an
indicator for whether the visit is a walk-in. Since patients do not visit clinics with sufficient
frequency over time, we estimate our visit-level model using ordinary least squares. We
specify the visit-level model as:
yvt = α + βF luDay + µi + νc + ηd + γm + δy + ρv + av + εvt, (2.2)
where arguments are defined as in equation 2.1 but with fixed effects for the reason for the
visit (ρv) and age range of the patient (av).
Table 2.3 presents the estimated effects of FluMist on total visit time, time spent in
different components of the visit, and the probability a visit is a walk-in. These results
again indicate that providers value spending time with each patient over clearing all patients
from the waiting room. Specifically, while we find a reduction in time spent in the waiting
room, these estimates are imprecisely estimated. We also find a larger 8-10% reduction in
the length of time spent in the check out process, and we estimate a slight reduction of 3%
(significant only at the 90% level) in the length of time with a nurse; however, the effect on
time with nurses appears to be driven by the nurses who are temporarily removed from the
clinic for FluMist administration. Also, note that on FluMist days, visits are more than 10%
less likely to be walk-in patients, implying that scheduled patients get priority when time
constraints bind. Overall, patients’ total visit time on a FluMist day decreased by at least
7%, regardless of whether they were seen by a nurse who administered FluMist on that day,
but this reduction is driven by streamlining administrative areas of the process, in particular
check-out times, with no significant reduction in nurse minutes among non-FluMist nurses.
Given that a FluDay represents, on average, a 16% reduction in production capability, the
compensations we see are far from complete.
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Table 2.3: Results for Visit-level Analysisa
All Visits Non-FluMist Nursesb
Log Total Minutes -0.071*** -0.077***
(0.018) (0.020)
Log Check-in Minutes -0.019 -0.016
(0.048) (0.060)
Log Waiting Room Minutes -0.058 -0.066
(0.037) (0.042)
Log Nurse Minutes -0.028* -0.016
(0.016) (0.021)
Log Check-out Minutes -0.105*** -0.081**
(0.034) (0.039)
Walk-in Visit -0.105*** -0.110***
(0.030) (0.035)
aResults for the estimate on the FluDay coefficient based on ordinary least squares regressions.
Column (1) reflects estimates from the full sample of all clinic visits, while column (2) presents
results limited to non-FluMist nurses. Different outcomes are presented in each row. Additional
covariates excluded from the table include indicator variables for the clinic, provider, reason for visit,
age range of patient, day of the week, month of the year, and year. Standard errors in parenthesis
clustered at the nurse level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
bEstimates based on patients seen by nurses who were in the clinic all day (i.e., excluding nurses
who left the office to administer FluMist).
2.4 Theoretical Framework
While the initial analysis in Section 2.3 shows some evidence of nurse behaviors when
short-staffed, several features of the clinical context and the FluMist vaccine administration
enable greater insight on the underlying mechanisms driving these results. In particular,
what (if anything) do these results say about a provider’s preferences and willingness to
trade off time with patients versus patients seen? To that end, we borrow elements from
[31] and [3], among others, to motivate further empirical analysis with a hypothetical loss
function for a provider engaged in the production of public services.
This conceptual framework is a natural fit for our research question as it accommodates
two key stylized facts of services where labor is the primary input and quality of the service
provided is a function of time with the customer. First, since demand is stochastic, clinics
have some excess capacity on a median day. Second, given an expected arrival rate of patients
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to the clinic as a whole, a reduction in the number of providers is equivalent to a proportional
increase in the arrival rate of patients to a remaining provider. The goal of the agents in our
context is not to maximize profits but instead to ensure that a patient’s needs for care are
met.14
Individuals (patients) are assumed to arrive following a Poisson process, with mean
arrival rate, denoted λ, over a unit of time normalized to one. Service time is also assumed
to be distributed exponentially, with a mean service time denoted by µ. Providers minimize
a loss function in each period (day) with respect to the average time spent with each patient
(µ). We assume the function is additively separable in two arguments: 1) disutility from
spending less time on average with patients than some fixed ideal amount of time, denoted
by τ ; and 2) disutility from leaving patients unseen. Assuming that the mean service time
is less than one, the number of unseen patients can be expressed as (λ − 1/µ), and the
provider’s loss function can be written as
U(µ|τ, λ) = f(τ − µ) + g(λ− 1
µ
). (2.3)
By definition, both f(·) and g(·) are assumed to be decreasing and convex. We impose
a convenient functional form to derive a comparative static and evaluate how shocks to the
provider’s arrival rate, λ, affect the provider’s optimal choice of time spent with patients.
Assuming that f(·) and g(·) are exponential functions,




where α captures the disutility from spending less time than ideal with patients, and β
captures the disutility from leaving patients unseen. Taking the derivative with respect to
14Prices are pre-determined by KCHD, and most patients visiting the public health clinics face a nominal
price of zero.
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) = 0. (2.5)
Note that when λ ≤ 1
τ
, it follows that µ∗ = τ since the provider’s time constraint is
not binding. In other words, when the arrival rate of patients is sufficiently low, providers
can spend the time they need with each patient without incurring disutility from turning
patients away or having patients leave voluntarily because of wait times. When λ > 1
τ
,
however, providers choose µ∗ such that equation 2.5 holds.
We are centrally interested in how µ∗ changes in response to an exogenous change in λ,
which is captured in our empirical analysis by the reduction in clinic staffing to administer












such that the effect of a change in the arrival rate on the optimal amount of time spent with
each patient is a function of preference parameters α and β, the current value of (τ − µ),
and the initial value of the arrival rate, λ.
This framework provides two key insights. First, the convex disutility of shortening
visits equates to diminishing marginal returns with respect to average visit length. Providers
are more willing to sacrifice time with patients when their average visit time is close to ideal
than when it is considerably smaller. Second, conditional on a fixed µ, greater arrival rates
will result in larger adjustments to µ∗; however, this is somewhat misleading. As λ increases,
we expect that providers will reduce µ∗, which will mute the effects of the increased arrival
rate. In Figure 2.2, we therefore solve for µ∗ for values of λ from 2 to 5 in 0.05 increments,
and then present the first differences in µ∗ as a numerical comparative static that takes
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Figure 2.2: First differences in µ∗ as λ increases by 0.05
into account changes in µ∗ as λ increases. The observation that the numerical change in µ∗
decreases as λ increases implies that increasing marginal disutility of (τ − µ) dominates.
Figure 2.2 depicts how the comparative static of the optimal amount of time spent with
patients changes under different conditions and different relative valuations of α and β. The
two key takeaways here are: 1) dµ∗/dλ is negative and larger in magnitude when providers
place more importance on seeing all patients relative to spending the “ideal” amount of time
with each patient; and 2) exactly how providers will change µ∗ in response to a FluMist
induced change in λ will depend on the circumstances of the clinic in that day – including
the arrival rate of patients.
This expository model therefore shows that exogenous reductions in capacity (i.e., an
increase in the arrival rate of patients for remaining providers) can have different effects
depending on the preferences of the provider and the volume of patients in the clinic that
day. On relatively light days (i.e., when λ < 1/τ), the clinic will have some amount of excess
capacity. Since providers’ time constraints are not binding, there is no need to adjust the
time they spend with each patient. On days when the clinic is closer to capacity, we expect
a positive shock to the arrival rate to result in some decrease in µ∗. Finally, when the clinic
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is seeing very high numbers of patients, a change in λ is likely to have very little effect on
µ∗ as providers may be unwilling to sacrifice additional time with each patient.
2.5 Provider Responses to Decreased Capacity
Our initial results in Section 2.3 showed relatively little evidence of sufficient
compensating behavior on behalf of the non-FluMist nurses. Our expository model suggests
that this result could be driven by at least two factors: 1) there could be sufficient excess
capacity already in the clinic such that clinics can absorb a temporary staff reduction without
affecting actual patient care; or 2) nurses may exhibit a preference for time with patients
over the number of patients seen. While several factors make a direct structural estimation
of the provider’s optimization problem infeasible, we attempt to distinguish between these
two explanations throughout this section.15
Our goal is to isolate situations in which capacity constraints are more likely binding
and examine the effect of a reduction in capacity on such days. While we do not directly
observe when constraints are binding, we attempt to identify such instances by exploiting
variation in daily total visits to the clinic as well as exogenous short staffing. This approach
arguably separates the role of nurse preferences from the role of built-in clinic capacity.
We pursue this approach with two additional models. First, at the provider level, we
estimate an unconditional quantile regression with provider fixed effects to examine how the
effect of FluMist on total number of patients seen varies over the distribution of patient
volume [36, 7]. In this case, our fixed effects specification intuitively controls for time-
invariant work characteristics of a given provider (i.e., nurse), and our quantile regressions
investigate the different effects of FluMist days as the mean arrival rates also increases. We
also include as covariates a set of dummy variables for day of the week, year, month, and
15One barrier in particular is that we do not observe people leaving the clinic. We instead only observe
patients who ultimately received treatment at the clinic; although we do observe whether the visit was
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Figure 2.3: Quantile Regression Estimates on Log Total Visits by Total Visit Volume
clinic, as in our initial estimates of equation (1). Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Figure 2.3.
For nurses removed from the clinic (the dashed line and respective confidence interval),
we see no reduction in total patient volume for very low volume days. This is consistent with
the notion that on sufficiently low demand days, a given provider may otherwise have some
downtime. On these low demand days, being gone from the clinic for half the day does not
substantially affect total visit volume, and administering FluMist vaccines essentially absorbs
some of that downtime. As total patient volume increases, we see that being absent the clinic
for half the day has a larger negative effect on the number of patients seen. In other words,
on days that are busier than the median day, providers who are removed from the clinic
see fewer than half the patients they otherwise would have. Of perhaps greater importance,
among the nurses remaining in the clinic during FluMist days, we see no significant change
in patient volume even on high volume days. While the magnitude of our estimates for the
effect of FluMist on daily patient volume is larger on high volume days, the estimated effects
are not large enough to offset the lost capacity from the FluMist nurses, and these estimates
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Figure 2.4: Effects of FluMist on Length of Visit by Visit Volume
results show that non-FluMist nurses do not fully compensate in the number of patients
seen when staff is reduced on high volume days, suggesting that nurses prioritize time with
individual patients over number of patients seen.
Second, we consider visit-level outcomes, where we model how the effect of FluMist on
time with patients and other visit times change as we restrict the sample to increasingly high-
volume days. Similar to our quantile regressions at the provider-level, this analysis focuses
on days in which capacity constraints are more likely binding and offers additional insight on
a provider’s underlying preference for patients treated versus time with each patient. The
differential effects of FluMist days by patient volume are presented graphically in Figure 2.4.
The top panel presents the estimated effect and 95% confidence interval of FluMist on log
number of minutes the nurse spends with a given patient, and the bottom panel presents
results for log minutes of all other components of the visit. Each line is constructed from
a separate visit-level regression using ordinary least squares, analogous to that of equation
(2), but where the estimation sample is limited only to those days with at least v visits in a
day.
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The results support a relationship between clinic capacity and visit length. While they
are broadly consistent with the regression analysis in Table 2.3, they further inform that
providers prioritize spending time with patients when capacity constraints bind. Specifically,
as the number of visits per day increases, we initially see a small effect from a staffing
reduction on nurse minutes but a substantial effect on other minutes (over 10% reduction).
This effect on other minutes persists up to over 30 visits per day, or the 75th percentile
of visit volume. Starting at 15 visits per day, providers’ time constraints begin to bind to
where increased arrival rates from FluMist days reduces an RN’s time spent with patients.
For days with total visit volume between 20 and 32 visits, RNs spend slightly over 5% less
time with each patient, and even at the point where the estimated effect is largest (visit
volume of 30), providers only reduce the time spent with patients by approximately 7% (or
just over 2 minutes). However, consistent with our theoretical framework in Section 2.4,
RNs do not further reduce time with patients on days where they are already sufficiently
constrained (days with over 35 visits). This again suggests that providers strongly value
time with patients over number of patients seen.
2.6 Robustness
While we contend that the administration of the FluMist vaccine was exogenous to any
given clinic, it remains possible that other time-varying factors may be driving the selection
of FluMist days from the KCHD central office. To examine this potential issue, we conducted
placebo tests to verify that our results are driven by FluMist adminstration. To do so, we
randomly draw 50 sets of placebo ‘FluMist’ days and compare our estimated coefficients in
Section 2.3 to the distribution of estimated coefficients from the placebo ‘FluMist’ days.
Figure 2.5 presents the results. Effects of the true FluDay on total visit time and check-
out time are greater than all placebo estimates (Figure 2.5a and Figure 2.5d).16 Looking
at ready nurse time and nurse time, respectively, Figures 2.5b and 2.5c similarly show that
16Since the estimates are negative, the true estimates are expected to be to the left end of the distributions.
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(a) Total Time (b) Ready Nurse Time
(c) Nurse Time (d) Check-out Time
Note: Each figure illustrates a distribution of βt estimates from Equation 2.1 for the given
outcome, where the distribution is generated by randomly sampling about 6% of the dates
from the dataset. Solid lines represent the βt estimate for FluDay, which can be found in
column 1 of Table 2.3.
Figure 2.5: Placebo Tests
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over 95% of placebo coefficients have larger estimates than the true estimate. We conclude
from these results that our estimates specifically from ‘FluMist’ days do not appear to be
driven simply by random variation in visits over time but are instead reflective of some true
underlying changes in nurse behaviors on FluMist days.
2.7 Discussion
In this paper, we exploit an exogenous source of variation in the capacity of public
health clinics in the form of temporary staff reductions induced by FluMist days. Our
results indicate that capacity reductions influence clinic behaviors along two margins: 1)
on the extensive margin, clinics see fewer patients and prioritize scheduled visits over walk-
ins; and 2) on the intensive margin, clinics first work to minimize administrative aspects of
the visit but may ultimately reduce time with patients on high volume days. Overall, our
findings indicate that providers value spending sufficient time with patients over seeing as
many patients as possible.
In several aspects, we emphasize that these results represent a lower bound on the
effect of capacity reductions, particularly when generalized to other areas of service provision.
First, the service provided in the setting we study is fairly transactional (e.g., immunizations,
disease screening, pregnancy tests, etc.). Most patients are referred to other providers if they
have more nuanced or specialized needs. Because the nature of these visits is relatively simple
within the health care context, there is less discussion/education to truncate than there may
be in a family physician or hospital setting. For example, our results stand in contrast to
[86], who examine provider behavior in emergency rooms. While emergency rooms are less
able to delay care than public health clinics, they may be better able to adjust to increased
demand by hastening discharges. Second, our estimates only reflect the short run effects
from temporary staff reductions. The nature of our exogenous variation does not capture
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longer-term compounding effects on the quality of care due to other factors such as provider
fatigue from increased workload, absenteeism, or intention to quit.
Our results may offer some guidance as to the potential effects of staffing reductions
in the provision of public services. Such reductions, even in the presence of some median-
day excess capacity, are not without cost. We identify two responses to capacity reductions
in particular. First, we find that providers maintain some minimum amount of time with
customers such that remaining service providers do not fully compensate for the staffing
reduction. We also find that providers prioritize scheduled visits over walk-in visits. The
implication from these findings is that some customers go unseen. Second, while the
reduction in time with customers is relatively small, the magnitude of reduction could be
meaningful in certain settings.
Given our specific setting of public health clinics, each of these responses could
carry important costs. For example, given that public health clinics immunize against
communicable disease and treat sexually transmitted infections, untreated patients may
generate substantial negative externalities. In addition, while a 5%-7% decrease in time with
nurses may seem small, length of patients’ time spent with providers has been shown to be
a key determinant of ‘quality of care’ [62, 89, 90, 57, 87, 19, 3, 72, 68]. For example, findings
from Yarnall et al. [91] suggest that a 5% reduction in time with patients would be sufficient
to have otherwise counseled patients on STD prevention or contraception. Quantifying these
responses in other contexts is a key piece of information if we are to understand the full effects
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A Solving the Model
Section 1.2 discusses how the individual makes decisions in each period to maximize
his lifetime utility. Recall that in the first stage, he chooses an occupation and realizes his
wage. Then he chooses how to allocate time and money in the second stage. His body weight
updates in the beginning of the next period as a result. In this appendix, we show how to
solve the model. First, given the timing of the individual’s decisions, we rewrite equation
1.2, or the individual’s utility function in the following way:




t ); Xt, Bt, νt) (A.1)
Equation A.1 is different from equation 1.2 in the EV () term, which shows the timing
of the individual’s choices. In the first stage, the individual chooses his occupation with
knowledge of the expected value of utility from his second stage choices (food, consumption
and leisure). Thus, when we take the first order condition of the utility function with respect
to job requirements, we get the following:
J∗t = J(Bt,Xt) (A.2)
In the theoretical model, wage is considered a function of job requirements and so the solution
for wage is as follows:
ω∗t = ω(Bt,Xt) (A.3)
In the empirical specification, wage and job requirements are jointly determined in the first
stage.17
In the second stage,conditional on his chosen occupation and realized wage, the
individual maximizes the EV () term in equation A.1 subject to his time and money
17With exclusion restrictions Mt and Xc added to the first order condition, we get the solutions in
equations 1.8 to 1.11.
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constraints (equations 1.6 and 1.7). Substituting Ct and Lt with the constrains and rewriting
the utility function, now we have:









This is what the individual maximizes in the second stage. Now we take the first order



































Lastly, the solution for BMI (equation 1.17) has already been discussed in section 1.2.
18Similarly, with exclusion restrictions Xc in this stage added to the first order condition, we get the
solutions in equations 1.12 to 1.16.
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B Tables for Robustness Checks
Tables B.1 - B.5 mentioned in section 2.6 are in this appendix.
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Table B.1: Robustness Check: Stage One Regression Results
Outcome






























































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
69
Table B.2: Robustness Check: Stage Two Regression Results
Outcome











































































































































































































































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Table B.4: Robustness Check: Initial Condition Regression Results
Outcome




















































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%,
** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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Table B.5: Robustness Check: Marginal Effects of Job Requirements on Body Weight and
Second-stage Dependent Variables
Job requirement



























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates significance level at 10%,
** at 5% and *** at 1%, respectively.
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